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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Sheldon Don Stone appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury
verdicts finding him guilty of conspiracy, battery with intent to commit a serious
felony (robbery), and robbery claiming the state failed to present any evidence
corroborating the accomplice testimony against him.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedinas
The state charged Stone with criminal conspiracy, battery with intent to
commit a serious felony (robbery), and robbery (R., pp.22-24), after he conspired
with Dustin Bailey, Tyler Wall, and Jeremy Sanderson to beat and rob
Sanderson's former landlord, Douglas Griffith, because Douglas would not return
Sanderson's $150.00 deposit. (Tr., p.76, L.2 - p.77, L.19, p.143, L . l - p.158,
L.22.) Stone pled not guilty and proceeded to trial, after which a jury convicted
him of all counts alleged in the Information. (Tr., p.431, L.7

- p.432, L.13;

R.,

pp.174-75.)
Stone filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, contending "there was no
basis by which the jury could reach a guilty verdict" because, he contended,
"[tjhe only evidence linking [Stone] to the crime was the testimony of the
accomplice, Jeremy Sanderson." (R., pp.179-80.) The court denied the motion.

(R., pp.219-31.) Stone also filed a motion for mistrial, which the court denied.
(R., pp.181-82, 219-31.)
The court imposed concurrent unified twelve-year sentences with three
years fixed on all three counts, but retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.184-89.) At the

conclusion of the period of retained jurisdiction, the court suspended Stone's
sentences and placed him on probation. (R., pp.197-204.) Stone appealed. (R.,
pp.233-35.)

ISSUE
Stone states the issue on appeal as:
Can Mr. Stone's convictions stand where the accomplice testimony
upon which they are based was not corroborated by any other
evidence tending to connect Mr. Stone to the charged offenses?
(Appellant's Brief, p.10.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Was there substantial, competent evidence presented at trial, including
corroborating evidence, from which the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt
that Stone was guilty of conspiracy, battery with intent to commit a serious felony
(robbery), and robbery?

ARGUMENT
There Was Substantial, Competent Evidence Presented At Trial From Which The
Jurv Found Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Stone Was Guilty Of Conspiracy,
Batterv With Intent To Commit A Serious Felony (Robberv), And Robbery
A.

Introduction
Stone challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's

verdicts finding him guilty of conspiracy, battery with intent to commit a serious
felony (robbery), and robbery, claiming he was convicted "based solely on the
testimony of an alleged accomplice," without any corroboration of that testimony.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-16.) A review of the record shows, however, that the
state presented substantial, competent evidence, including corroboration of
Sanderson's testimony, from which the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt
that Stone was guilty of each alleged offense. Stone has failed to show any
basis for reversal of his convictions.
B.

Standard Of Review
An appellate court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon

a jury verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. State v. Oliver, 144 ldaho 722, 724, 170 P.3d 387, 389 (2007); State v.

Reveg, 121 ldaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Hart, 112 ldaho
759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). In conducting this review the
appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences
to be drawn from the evidence. Qliver, 144 ldaho at 724, 170 P.3d at 387; State

v. Knutson, 121 ldaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991);

m, 112 ldaho at

761, 735 P.2d at 1072. Moreover, the facts, and inferences to be drawn from
those facts are construed in favor of upholding the jury's verdict.
ldaho at 724, 170 P.3d at 387;
C.

m,144

m,112 ldaho at 761, 735 P.2d at 1072

The State Presented Substantial. Competent Evidence At Trial, Including
Corroboration Of Sanderson's Testimony From Which The Jury Found
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Stone Was Guiltv Of Conspiracy,
Batterv With lntent To Commit A Serious Felonv (Robbery), And Robbery
Count I of the lnformation alleged "Sheldon D. Stone, on or about July 1,

2006, in Bingham County, Idaho, did combine or conspire with another, to-wit:
Dustin Bailey and/or Tyler Wall and/or Jeremy Sanderson to commit the crime(s)
of Robbery andlor Battery With the lntent to Commit a Serious Felony." Count I
further alleged certain overt acts taken in furtherance of the conspiracy,
including: "On or about July 1, 2006; Dustin Bailey andlor Tyler Wall andlor
Sheldon Don Stone traveled by car to the Carol Street Apartments to meet with
Doug Griffith, manager of the Carol Street Apartments." (R., p.23.) Counts II
and Ill of the lnformation alleged:
COUNT 2: Sheldon Don Stone, on or about July 1, 2006, in
Bingham County, Idaho, aided and abetted Dustin Bailey and Tyler
Wall in the commission of the offense of Battery With the lntent to
Commit a Serious Felony, by driving Dustin Bailey and Tyler Wall to
the Carol Street Apartments for the purpose of committing the
crime of Battery with the lntent to Commit a Serious Felony, took
the car to a location where it would not be seen by Doug Griffith,
and after Dustin Bailey and Tyler Wall had committed the offense,
drove Dustin Bailey and Tyler Wall away from the location of the
Carol Street Apartments.
COUNT 3: Sheldon Don Stone, on or about July 1, 2006, in
Bingham County, Idaho, aided and abetted Dustin Bailey and Tyler
Wall in the commission of the offense of Robbery, by driving Dustin

Bailey and Tyler Wall to the Carol Street Apartments for the
purpose of committing the crime of Robbery, took the car to a
location where it would not be seen by Doug Griffith, and after
Dustin Bailey and Tyler Wall had committed the offense, drove
Dustin Bailey and Tyler Wall away from the location of the Carol
Street Apartments.
(R., pp.23-24 (emphasis in original).)
Consistent with the allegations in the Information, Sanderson testified at
trial that he called Bailey and "asked him to come to Blackfoot and beat up [his]
landlord." (Tr., p.143, L . l - p.144, L.7.) Bailey agreed and drove to Blackfoot
later that day with Wall and Stone. (Tr., p.145, L.13 - p.146, L.13, p.262, L.14 p.263, L.16.) After they arrived, Sanderson told Bailey where the apartments
were located and advised him to park in the parking lot behind the apartments,
"so they couldn't be seen." (Tr., p.148, Ls.8-12, p.149, Ls.14-21.) Sanderson
also told Bailey that if Douglas had "any money, to take it." (Tr., p.152, Ls.1623.)
Wall was present during the conversation as was Stone. (Tr., p.148, L.17

- p.149, L.lO.) Although Stone was approximately ten feet away sitting on the
porch and did not participate in the conversation, Sanderson testified Stone was
paying attention to the conversation. (Tr., p.151, L.18 - p.152, L.lO.)
After receiving direction from Sanderson, Bailey called Douglas, gave him
a fake name, and told him he was interested in renting an apartment. (Tr., p.149,
L.22 - p.150, L.23, p.268, L.11 - p.269, L.15.) Douglas and Bailey arranged to
meet at the apartments. (Tr., p.268, L . l l

- p.269, L.15.)

After Bailey arranged a

meeting time, Bailey told Stone to drive, and Bailey, Stone, and Wall left. (Tr.,
p.151, Ls.10-13, p.152, L.24-p.153, L.14.)

When Douglas arrived at the apartments, he saw Bailey and Wall, but did
not see their car as they had parked according to Sanderson's instructions. (Tr.,
p.84, L.13-p.85, L.9, p.157, Ls.22-24, p.269, Ls.16-17, p.299, Ls.12-25.) While
Douglas was showing Bailey and Wall around the apartment, he was suddenly
"blind-sided" by a punch to his left ear. (Tr., p.90, L.8 - p.92, L.8, p.332, Ls.1517.) Bailey and Wall then began "hitting," "kicking," and "kneeing" Douglas. (Tr.,
p.92, Ls.11-16.) One of them then said, "Give us your wallet," and reached into
Douglas's pocket and took approximately $1200.00 cash from Douglas's pocket

- rent money Douglas had collected earlier that day from other tenants. (Tr., p.,
Ls.2-19, p.95, Ls.4-21.)
Bailey and Wall left the apartment, got back in the car with Stone, and
returned to Sanderson's house.

(See Tr.,

p.284, Ls.11-24, p.300, Ls.4-7.)

Sanderson testified that when they returned, Stone was still driving. (Tr., p.158,
Ls.19-22.) Once back at Sanderson's house, Sanderson said Bailey, Wall, and
Stone were "excited" and "hyped up."

(Tr., p.154, Ls.6-25.)

Bailey told

Sanderson "everything that happened, then pulled out $1,200," which he split up
amongst the four of them.

(Tr., p.156, Ls.10-14.)

Sanderson testified he

"believe[d] [he] got five hundred, and everybody else got, I think, two," including
Stone. (Tr.,p.156,L.17-p.I57,L.l.)
On appeal, and in his motion for judgment of acquittal, Stone argues that
Sanderson's testimony is insufficient to sustain his convictions because

Sanderson was an accomplice'

and, as such, his testimony required

corroboration, but the state offered none.
pp.179-80.)

(Appellant's Brief, pp.11-16; R.,

While Stone is correct in his assertion that ldaho law requires

corroboration of accomplice testimony, he is incorrect in his conclusion that such
corroboration did not exist in this case
ldaho Code § 19-2117 states:

-

Testimony of accomplice Corroboration. - A conviction cannot
be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless he is
corroborated by other evidence, which in itself, and without the aid
of the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant
with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not
sufficient, if it merely shows the commission of the offense, or the
circumstances thereof.
(Emphasis in original.)
"This statutory corroboration requirement is intended to protect against the
danger that an accomplice may wholly fabricate testimony, incriminating an
innocent defendant in order to win more favorable treatment for the accomplice."
Matthews v. State, 136 ldaho 46, 49, 28 P.3d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 2001). The
corroborating evidence required by I.C. § 19-2117 does not, however, "need to
be sufficient to sustain a conviction on its own, nor must it corroborate every
detail of the accomplice's testimony." State v. Mitchell, 146 Idaho 378, -,
P.3d 737, 742 (Ct. App. 2008) (citations omitted).

195

Rather, the corroborating

evidence may be "slight," and "need only go to one material fact."
the corroborating evidence "may be entirely circumstantial."

Id. Moreover,

& "Statements

' The jury was instructed: "Dustin bailey, Tyler Wall and Jeremy Sanderson are
accomplices." (R., p.147 (Instruction No. 22).)

attributed to the defendant himself may serve as the necessary corroboration."
Id., 146 Idaho a t , 195 P.3d at 741-42.
Stone claims there is insufficient evidence to affirm his convictions
because, he contends, "there is no evidence, independent of Mr. Sanderson's
testimony, tending to connect Mr. Stone to the alleged offenses against Mr.
Griffith." (Appellant's Brief, p.14 (emphasis in original).) To the contrary, there
was testimony from Detective Rocky Cronquist, as well as, testimony offered by
Stone that corroborated Sanderson's testimony and "tendiedl to connect [Stone]
with the commission of the offense."
Detective Cronquist testified that he interviewed Stone about the crimes in
December 2006. (Tr., p.246, Ls.3-16.) Detective Cronquist "explained" to Stone
that he "needed to talk to him in regards to an incident that occurred" in Blackfoot
and, although Detective Cronquist never mentioned any names, Stone "indicated
that the only thing he was aware of is what he had seen on the news regarding
Mr. Bailey and Mr. Wall." (Tr., p.247, L.22 - p.248, L.2.) Stone also originally
denied being in Blackfoot at the time. (Tr., p.248, Ls.24-25.) However, Stone
later admitted he was in Blackfoot when the crimes occurred. (Tr., p.252, Ls.1618.) In addition, when Detective Cronquist told Stone "he could probably have

the same deal as the individual that was cooperating," Stone's response was
"that all he knew was that it was -- a guy owed somebody some money, and
that's what the whole thing was all about."

(Tr., p.249, Ls.12-14.)

Stone's

detailed knowledge of the crime five months after it occurred,' including the
names of two of the individuals involved, and his eventual admission that he was
in Blackfoot on the day of the crimes "tends to connect [him] with the commission
of the offense[sj" independent of Sanderson's testimony as required by I.C. § 1921 17.
In addition, although both Bailey and Wall denied that Stone participated
in or had any knowledge of the actual crimes, both testified that he was with them
on that day and drove to the apartments and waited in the car.3

(Seegenerally

Tr., pp.259-310.) While Bailey and Wall were undoubtedly accomplices, their
testimony regarding Stone's presence should be considered as corroborative
evidence because they were called on Stone's behalf at trial. Consequently,
there is no reason to discount their testimony in order "to protect against the
danger" that it was fabricated to incriminate Stone "in order to win more favorable
treatment for" either Bailey or Wall. Matthews, 136 Idaho at 49, 28 P.3d at 390.
Quite the contrary, their testimony was offered by Stone for the sole purpose of
helping him. As such, it is properly considered as corroborative, and supports

Stone characterizes the news coverage as "widespread," complains that the
district court "assumed that the only media coverage of the case . . . occurred
around the time of the commission of the alleged offenses," and argues "any
factual finding to that effect would be clearly erroneous, as there is no evidence
in the record to support such a finding." (Appellant's Brief, p.15 and 17.7.)
Contrary to Stone's assertions, the evidence in the record regarding the news
coverage of the crimes is not that it was "widespread," but that Detective
Cronquist agreed with defense counsel that "it was all over the news," by which
he meant he saw "it in the morning newspaper . . . in Blackfoot." (Tr., p.251,
Ls.16-21.) Stone lives in Pocatello (Tr., p.251, L.24 - p.252, L.l); there was no
evidence regarding the quantity of news coverage of the crimes, if any, in
Pocatello.
Stone also admitted as much to the presentence investigator. (PSI, p.3.)

Sanderson's testimony that Stone was involved in the commission of the
offenses.

See People v. Fuqua, 222 Cal.App.2d 306, 312, 35 Cal.Rptr. 163, 166

(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (rejecting Fuqua's claim that the trial court erred in
ailing to instruct the jury that accomplice testimony ought to be viewed with
distrust since the "three codefendants were not witnesses for the prosecution but
testified solely on their own behalf, and their testimony tended to corroborate
[Fuqua's] version").
Because there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdicts,
including evidence which corroborated Sanderson's testimony, Stone has failed
to establish error.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Stone's convictions.
DATED this 3othday of March 2009.
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